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WILL EXPEDIENCY ALONE DETERMINE ALLIED POLICY IN EUROPE?

THE curtain of Anglo-American official silence on foreign affairs that had grown increasingly impenetrable since the Teheran Conference was only partially lifted by Mr. Churchill in his report to Parliament on February 22. The bulk of this report was, understandably, devoted to a summation of the military progress of the United Nations, with special emphasis on Britain's contribution to the common effort, and on the difficulties that must be surmounted before Germany's military power is crushed. In touching on some of the political problems of conquered Europe that have threatened to divide Britain, Russia and the United States, Mr. Churchill expressed the policy of his government in the following formula: "Our feelings . . . follow the principle of keeping good faith with those who have kept good faith with us, and of striving without prejudice or regard for political affections to aid those who strike for freedom against the Nazi rule and inflict the greatest injury upon the enemy."

The yardstick, apparently, is to be military effort, not ideology. But, since the firmest and most consistent resistance to the Nazis has come from those who are opposed to Nazi ideas and practices, this yardstick would make it possible for Britain to collaborate with individuals and groups who may not, at this moment, enjoy official recognition. This has already proved the case with respect to Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, to whom Mr. Churchill paid an unusually warm tribute, while at the same time saying: "we cannot dissociate ourselves in any way" from King Peter. Reports that Captain Randolph Churchill, son of the Prime Minister, is now at Tito's headquarters, and that King Peter has asked the British to facilitate his return to London for consultations and to shake off the influence of reactionary elements in his entourage may point in the direction of some compromise between the King and Tito.

A somewhat similar development, although

couched in a different form, may result from the unresolved controversy over Poland. Here Moscow's insistence on the creation of a Polish government friendly to Russia; Britain's desire to find a workable basis for collaboration with Russia in postwar Europe; and the persisting intransigence of the conservative nationalist elements in the Polish government-in-exile concerning the Curzon Line, which has Britain's approval—all play an important part. Should a shake-up now occur in official Polish circles, and should a reorganized cabinet collaborate with Russia in common resistance against Germany, the British would presumably give such a régime their support. But if no change takes place among the Poles in London, and meanwhile the Polish underground opposes the Germans at the side of Russia, as the Partisans are doing in Yugoslavia, then it is not inconceivable that the British might eventually give such aid as they can to a resistance movement in Poland, without openly abandoning the Polish government-in-exile which has kept "good faith" with Britain to the extent of its practical ability.

BRITAIN KEEPS DOORS OPEN. The political situation inside Europe is so fluid that it is entirely natural for Britain to keep open as many doors to the future as possible. This was the burden of Anthony Eden's speech in the House of Commons on February 23, when he said that the British government reserves the right to intervene in the settlement of political affairs in any part of Europe, but that the object of its foreign policy is to maintain peace and the rights of small nations with the aid of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Russia and the United States. Moreover, the fact—pointed out by Mr. Churchill—that the British, in contrast to the first two years of war, can no longer speak for themselves alone, but must consider the interests and plans of their allies, imposes a real limitation on their power of initiative. The Churchill and Eden speeches, how-

ever, reveal two ominous trends—ominous because, if they develop, and are allowed to have a decisive influence on the peace settlement, they may undo the results of military victory.

OMINOUS TRENDS. The first of these trends is the almost contemptuous attitude displayed by Mr. Churchill toward the six political parties of Italy that have been striving to create a basis for a non-Fascist régime. This attitude is justified by the British Prime Minister on the ground that the Italian parties do not command military force, while Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel can presumably place some armed strength at the disposal of the allies; and a vague promise is given that "it is from Rome that a more broadly based government can best be formed." It is understandable that, in the midst of the arduous and bloody struggle for Italian beachheads, the Allies do not want to precipitate political controversies about Italy's future. But the controversies do exist, and they cannot be merely brushed aside without creating the impression in Italy—and elsewhere—that Britain and the United States are indifferent to the fundamental struggle between fascism and anti-fascism which has unleashed this war, and may survive it unless the roots of fascism are destroyed. Nor is it clear that such military assistance as Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel can guarantee to the Allies—and American sources would indicate that it is both slight and apathetic except for the Italian Navy—will counterbalance the disillusionment and disaffection left in the wake of Allied invasion. Even more important, if the policy followed by Britain and the United States in Italy is a token of what the Allies plan to do in defeated Germany, then there will be little hope of destroying the power of the military and conservative elements which perpetuated the semifeudal social structure of Germany after World War I.

The second ominous trend is the admission, in Mr.

Churchill's speech, that the dismemberment of Germany might offer a way of reconciling some of the existing or impending divergences among the United Nations. Russia set the scene for this development in its note broadcast on January 11 regarding Eastern Poland, when it said that the Poles could compensate themselves for territory ceded to Russia by taking East Prussia and parts of Silesia. It is entirely arguable, as Mr. Eden stated, that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter are not applicable to Germany. But it is difficult to see how the dismemberment of Germany would contribute to the pacification and reconstruction of Europe, especially if, meanwhile, the Allies take no steps—as unfortunately appears to be the case—toward the formation of an international organization within which post-war Germany could develop along constructive lines of collaboration with its neighbors, instead of destructive lines of resurgent nationalism.

It is the political, rather than the military, prognostications of Mr. Churchill that give his report a note of gloom which is absent from the realistic, but jubilant and confident order of the day issued by Stalin on February 23, announcing the liberation of three-quarters of Russia's invaded territory. Victory over Germany will prove arduous and costly. This both Churchill and Stalin admit. But the real test will come when victory has been achieved. This test will have to be met not only with the anxiety over possible political and economic upheavals which seems to mark the policy of Britain and the United States, but with a firm resolution to build an effective international organization on the foundations of wartime collaboration between the United Nations. Otherwise the "unfinished business" of 1919, as Stephen Bonsal calls it, will remain to be finished by yet another world war.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

LATEST ARGENTINE COUP WIDENS BREACH WITH UNITED STATES

The Argentine coup d'état which was climaxed by the enforced resignation of President Pedro Ramirez on February 25 has left great political confusion in its wake. The outside observer has lacked authoritative reports—indeed, whether the resignation followed any legal pattern is still in question—and it may be assumed that the Argentine people are equally confused. They have been subjected for some time to strict censorship regulations and have had less and less participation in government affairs, particularly since June 1943 when General Ramirez succeeded to the Presidency in a coup which ousted Ramón S. Castillo. In fact there has been an increasing tendency toward an executive dictatorship since 1940, when Castillo became Acting President in place of Roberto Ortiz.

RECOGNITION IN QUESTION. The Ramirez

"resignation" justifies the suspended judgment with which the United States and the other American Republics greeted the Argentine action against Germany and Japan in January. Fearful lest the question of recognition of a new government be raised, the military *junta* which elevated former Vice President Edelmiro Farrell to the position held by General Ramirez contended that the change is but a temporary one and that the President resigned due to illness. Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., however, indicated that the shift involved a possible threat to this hemisphere and that consultation with the other American Republics would be undertaken. But it was not clear from his remarks whether the machinery of the Consultative Committee for the Political Defense of the Continent in Montevideo would be employed for this purpose, as was done

in the case of Bolivia.

Argentina is a crucial test not only for this hemisphere but for the United Nations as well. The problem of recognition raises broader questions of foreign policy involving issues relative to Spain and the Badoglio government in Italy. Now that the issue has been joined in Argentina, pressure both in Britain and the United States for a clearer policy toward Spain may be heightened. While there is no indication that the State Department will deal with the matter thus broadly, a continuance of the Department's stiffer attitude toward pro-fascist elements in South America can be expected. The United States will doubtless refuse to recognize the Farrell government, on the basis of the precedent established in the case of Bolivia. If a truly broad and democratic uprising should occur in Argentina, our traditional policy of nonrecognition on the ground that force had been used would presumably be waived in favor of the greater desirability of recognizing and supporting an anti-Axis régime. Such an eventuality, however, is not now anticipated. Rather, we may expect a continuance of personalized rule by Argentina's military leaders.

RULE BY MILITARY CLIQUES. The recent dramatic events in Argentina are but the latest stroke in what is a purely intermilitary struggle for control of political power. Within those limits events have taken devious turns. Thus on February 15 Foreign Minister Alberto Gilbert and Col. Enrique Gonzales, Secretary to the President, were ejected from the government by an ultra-nationalist young officer's group when it was reported that a declaration of war had been prepared by the President and his Foreign Minister. Rumors of such action, along with rumors of civil war, have come repeatedly from Argentina. But those officials who moved too speedily in the direction of a final break with the Axis were suspect. Hinting that such a policy was intended, and having prepared an announcement of cabinet changes in order to liberalize the government, the President had him-

self reached beyond the limits imposed by the military factions. That element of the Army which had ejected the Foreign Minister was in turn superseded by the ever-powerful GOU (*Grupo Oficiales Unidos*), or "colonel's clique," which has raised General Farrell to the Presidency.

With the inclusion of Col. Juan Domingo Perón as Minister of War in the new Farrell cabinet, the leader of the GOU has again entered the official government body. Colonel Perón held the portfolio of Labor when the Ramirez régime was openly pro-Axis, but was subsequently discarded when, on the eve of his resignation, the former President had also ousted Gen. Luis Perlinger, Minister of the Interior. It is this group of officers, with the aid of Col. Eduardo Avalos, commander of the Campo de Mayo barracks in the environs of the capitol, that manipulated the present coup. Reports that the majority of the Army are in sympathy with General Ramirez must await developments in the days immediately ahead. Should the GOU solidify its hold on the government, the Argentine people will endure further military rule until the shifting jealousies of the Army factions again demand a reshuffle. Under such circumstances, the courageous plea for the restoration of freedom of the press made by the editors of the famed liberal journal, *La Prensa*, will remain unheard and may well endanger their personal security. Not until the democratic forces in Argentina are able to overthrow the military rulers and re-introduce a constitutional régime will such efforts toward popular government be rewarded. But if the democratic forces are to triumph, they will need the official support of the United States and Britain, which they have not had in the past.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

The Captain Wears a Cross, by William A. Maguire. New York, Macmillan, 1943. \$2.00

My Fighting Congregation, by William C. Taggart. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1943. \$2.00

In view of the vital work being done by Catholic, Jewish and Protestant chaplains all over the fighting fronts and the camps, these two interesting books are worth reading. The first carries on Father Maguire's story of Pearl Harbor and of his life as a naval chaplain. Mr. Taggart's tells of his experiences with the U.S. Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific.

Spain, by Salvadore de Madariaga. New York, Creative Age Press, 1943. \$4.00

One of the most dispassionate and informative studies of the causes and course of the Spanish Civil War that has appeared. The author criticizes both sides in the Revolution and contends that Franco's victory resulted in large part from the failure of the Republicans to present a united front.

For a 25-year survey of the foreign policy of the Vatican, as well as a record of its relations with Italy, Spain, Germany and the U.S.S.R., READ—

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE VATICAN

by Sherman S. Hayden

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
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Washington News Letter



FEB. 28.—The State Department during World War I had 530 employees; in 1937 it had 850; now it has 2,500. Its expansion in the past seven critical years has been erratic, with responsibilities fuzzily divided. For example, the former Chief of the Division of International Communications was responsible to Assistant Secretary Adolph A. Berle, Jr., for matters relating to aviation; to Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long for shipping; and to Assistant Secretary G. Howland Shaw for telecommunications. Assistant Secretary Berle was in charge of international financial affairs, but Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson of international economic affairs. Berle supervised the issuance of passports, Long the issuance of visas. The Translating Division and the Cultural Relations Division were responsible directly to the Under Secretary but, busy with grave political questions, the Under Secretary could give them little attention.

STATE DEPARTMENT REORGANIZED. The Department was reorganized on January 15 to eliminate the inefficiency that grew out of its unwieldy, shapeless construction. Jurisdictional overlappings were removed, and the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretaries were clearly defined: Berle got Controls, Transportation and Communications; Acheson, Economic Affairs; Long, Congressional Relations; and Shaw, Administration and Public Information. Critics of the reorganization remarked, correctly, that few new men were added to the Department as a result but, in the six weeks which have elapsed since the changes went into effect, the improvement in State Department operations has been marked.

The foremost single achievement of the reorganization was the creation of a Policy Committee, composed of Secretary Cordell Hull, Under Secretary Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., the four Assistant Secretaries, Legal Adviser Green H. Hackworth, and Special Assistant to the Secretary Leo Pasvolsky. On February 22 Michael J. McDermott, special assistant to the Secretary in matters concerning the Department's relations with the press, was added to the Committee, which meets regularly three times a week to discuss current questions. Thus top officials of the Department participate in all decisions on high policy (although the final word in political matters often rests with President Roosevelt or the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee). Before January 15 the casually run Department reached high policy deci-

sions only through conference among those officials immediately interested.

Exploration of the Bolivian recognition problem, for instance, was monopolized by the Secretary and officers concerned with Latin American affairs, although its implications touched the whole range of American foreign policy. On the petroleum question, however—which has become acute since the reorganization—the higher officials have been contributing to the ultimate decision through their exchanges at Policy Committee meetings. Officers immediately concerned with whatever problem is before the Committee share in its discussions. When the Committee discusses Arabian oil, Charles D. Rayner, adviser on petroleum policy is present, with Wallace S. Murray, Director of the Office of Eastern and African Affairs, and John D. Hickerson, Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs. When it discusses Russia, Charles E. Bohlen, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, participates.

The new set-up shows the Department's awareness of special problems which a modern foreign office must face. An obvious child of the war is the Committee on Postwar Programs, whose Executive Director is Mr. Pasvolsky. In the Office of Economic Affairs, headed by Harry C. Hawkins, is a State Department newcomer, the Division of Labor Relations, whose task is to collect data on labor matters abroad. This Division's Acting Chief is Otis E. Mulliken, Harvard Ph.D., who was brought into the State Department from the Department of Agriculture, where he was an economist. He is to serve as liaison officer for the Department of State at the April conference of the International Labor Office. The reorganization provided an opportunity for paying increased attention to the Department's public relations, and on February 22 the January 15 informational set-up was revised in order to improve liaison between the State Department and the information offices of other governmental agencies.

MORE CHANGES TO COME. It will be the task of the newly created Division of Administrative Management, headed by M. L. Kenestruck, to note weaknesses in the Administrative system and propose further changes. Already Secretary Hull has hinted that two or three new assistant secretaries are to be added; one of these might deal with postwar matters and another with public relations. Such additions will probably involve further reorganization of the Department.

BLAIR BOLLES

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